@onereach/idw-init-account-resourcesnpm

npm/@onereach/idw-init-account-resources is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares scripts.preinstall = node setup.mjs, which on npm install downloads the Bun runtime from oven-sh/bun GitHub releases, chmods the extracted binary executable, and uses it to execute the sibling file math_init.js — a 727KB bundled file whose top-of-file uses a string-array rotator (function WV8StW) plus a large numeric constant table to hide its control flow, URLs, and API surface. The loader setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style hex identifiers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e) and string-lookup wrapper objects. package.json declares main: dist/index.js but no dist/ directory is shipped in the tarball, so the package delivers no library surface; the only code that runs on install is the obfuscated Bun-executed payload. The advertised DB-migration/account-resource-initialization functionality is not wired to any exported entrypoint. Running an obfuscated payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime at install time is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern used to bypass Node-scoped supply-chain scanning; the payload's behavior cannot be verified from source, and its purpose does not match the package's advertised function.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.