@onereach/billing-dtonpm

npm/@onereach/billing-dto is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is obfuscated with _0x-style identifiers and downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and uses that dropped runtime to execute a sibling file math_init.js shipped at the package root. math_init.js is a 727KB heavily-obfuscated bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header, string-array rotator WV8StW, decoder hc1jfK9, ~1000-entry mixed numeric/string constants array, hex-mangled identifiers) that cannot be inspected by Node-based tooling and only runs under the dropped Bun runtime. The package advertises itself as a DTO/enums types library and its declared main (dist/index.js) is a small pure enums module; neither the manifest nor any documentation references setup.mjs or math_init.js, and a types-only library has no legitimate need for an alternate language runtime or a large obfuscated bundle. The alternate-runtime-dropper shape (fetch a second runtime specifically to execute a large obfuscated sibling on npm install) combined with the DTO/payload purpose mismatch and the on-disk obfuscation is a supply-chain attack fingerprint.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.