@onereach/authorizer-helpernpm

npm/@onereach/authorizer-helper is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers, string-map jump tables) and, when the bun binary is not on PATH, downloads a platform-specific Bun release from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-CJS bundle heavily protected with an obfuscator.io-style shuffled string/number array, a rotator function, and a custom Base85-style decoder — its contents cannot be reasoned about from the surface. The package advertises itself as a small Authorizer 2 helper and index.js only references moment and loadsh; nothing in the declared purpose requires the Bun runtime or a 727KB obfuscated payload. Metadata further mismatches the shipped code: the dependencies list includes loadsh@^0.0.4, a known typosquat of lodash, pulled in transitively on install. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern — a Node-declared package fetching a non-Node runtime specifically to execute an obfuscated bundled payload at install time — hides the payload from Node-focused inspection and executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine on npm install.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.