@nstrlabs/sdknpm
Malicious code in @nstrlabs/sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, package.json runs preinstall: node index.js || true, unconditionally executing index.js. The script collects host identity fields (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, process.cwd(), and the package id), hex-encodes them as DNS labels, and resolves them as a subdomain of an interactsh OOB callback host (*.d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live), then also POSTs the same JSON payload to a bare IP HTTP endpoint at http://172.201.213.59:9090/c. Two independent exfiltration channels (DNS + HTTP) fire on every install, with || true swallowing errors so the exfil is silent. The package is a typosquat / dependency-confusion lure: version 99.0.1 is an unusually high pseudo-version, scope @nstrlabs and metadata (description: security research, author jeroengui) are placeholder-shaped, and the package has no other functionality — its sole effect on install is the recon beacon.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @nstrlabs/sdk (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @nstrlabs/sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@nstrlabs/sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @nstrlabs/sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @nstrlabs/sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @nstrlabs/sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.