@node-cloud/createnpm

index.js unconditionally requires @sql-trigger/nodesql at the top of the main file (var ins = require('@sql-trigger/nodesql');) but never references the imported value anywhere else in the package. The package's stated purpose is an npm publish helper exposing localPackage, remoteVersion, and publish via the npm programmatic API; the @sql-trigger-scoped dependency has no functional role in that purpose and belongs to an unrelated scope from a different publisher. The shape — innocuous wrapper code plus a publisher-mismatched, purpose-mismatched dependency that fires on require — is consistent with dependency smuggling, where the visible package serves only to land a sibling-scoped package onto installer machines at module load. The package itself contains no install-time lifecycle hook and no exfiltration code; the Travis-gated npm.registry.adduser path reads NPM_USERNAME/PASSWORD/EMAIL only when a consumer explicitly invokes publish() under Travis and sends them to the legitimate npm registry, which is the documented behavior of a publish helper and not a concern. The risk hinges on the contents and intent of @sql-trigger/nodesql, which must be evaluated separately to determine whether installer harm actually fires.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.