@nebula.js/stardustnpm

npm/@nebula.js/stardust is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

This version of @nebula.js/stardust declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that is not present in the legitimate qlik-oss/nebula.js upstream. setup.mjs uses obfuscator.io-style hex-named identifiers and property-indirection control flow. At install time it downloads a Bun runtime binary from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/..., extracts it to a temp directory, and invokes it via execFileSync to run the sibling file math_init.js — a 727KB // @bun @bun-cjs compiled bundle that is not runnable under Node and cannot be inspected without the fetched Bun runtime. If a local bun already exists it is used directly. Neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is listed in package.json files (which only declares LICENSE, core, dist, types/index.d.ts), yet both ship at the tarball root. README and description are copied verbatim from the legitimate QlikTech @nebula.js/stardust package, but the manifest/shipped-files divergence and the added preinstall are inconsistent with the upstream project. The alternate-runtime execution of an obfuscated compiled-CJS blob on the installer's machine at npm install time is an alternate-runtime-dropper pattern; the payload's behavior cannot be observed by Node-focused analysis. Combined with the scope-hijack indicators (undeclared smuggled files, brand-impersonation README, no such preinstall upstream), this version is a malicious release of a well-known scope.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.