@nebula.js/snapshooternpm

npm/@nebula.js/snapshooter is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall script runs node setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/ to a temp directory, chmod +x's the binary, and execFileSyncs it against a sibling math_init.js at npm install time. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) processed with obfuscator.io transforms (hex-named identifiers, shuffled string-array with a rotator, large numeric constant table). The file is not declared in package.json's files array (which lists only client.js and server.js) yet ships in the published tarball. The package is published under the @nebula.js scope attributed to QlikTech International AB / qlik-oss/nebula.js, whose legitimate snapshooter is a small Puppeteer wrapper with no preinstall hook, no setup.mjs, and no math_init.js — this version adds the dropper on top of the original code, consistent with a trojanized release under a reputable scope. Executing an undeclared obfuscated payload under a freshly downloaded alien interpreter at install time gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on every installer's machine and is designed to evade Node-based static scanners.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.