@nebula.js/sn-shapenpm

npm/@nebula.js/sn-shape is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The 1.5.1 tarball adds two files at the tarball root that are not present in the package's declared files manifest (dist, sn-shape-ext, api-spec/spec.json, core): setup.mjs and a 727 KB obfuscated Bun-compiled bundle math_init.js. package.json declares scripts.preinstall: "node setup.mjs". On npm install, setup.mjs checks for a local bun binary and, if absent, downloads a Bun runtime zip from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/..., extracts and chmods the binary, then invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D, 'math_init.js')], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: D }). math_init.js carries a // @bun @bun-cjs header and standard string-array/rotation obfuscation (function WV8StW(a,b,c){for(c=0;c<b;c++)a.push(a.shift());return a}, hundreds of hex-named identifiers). The package is published as a Qlik nebula.js shape-chart extension and has no documented reason to fetch an alternate language runtime at install time or to execute a bundled obfuscated program under it. The combination of an undeclared install-time payload, download of a second runtime to evade Node-based scanning, and execution of an obfuscated blob is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and gives whoever published this version arbitrary code execution on the installer's host at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.