@nebula.js/sn-nav-menunpm

npm/@nebula.js/sn-nav-menu is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Package publishes under the @nebula.js scope (claiming author 'QlikTech International AB') and advertises itself as a Qlik Sense navigation menu extension, but its package.json declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then execFileSyncs the Bun binary against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB // @bun @bun-cjs compiled blob with a rotated numeric constant table and hex-mangled identifiers (_0x...), unrelated to the package's stated Qlik navigation-menu purpose (whose React/MUI code lives in dist/). The payload only executes under the freshly downloaded second runtime, so its contents cannot be reviewed by normal Node-based inspection and it runs automatically on npm install. The scope/author claim to a legitimate Qlik ecosystem name combined with an obfuscated alternate-runtime dropper is the impersonation-plus-install-time-RCE shape.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.