@nebula.js/sn-distributionplotnpm

npm/@nebula.js/sn-distributionplot is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

This version of @nebula.js/sn-distributionplot declares preinstall: node setup.mjs in package.json. setup.mjs is an obfuscated loader (renamed _0x... identifiers, per-call string dictionaries) that downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh GitHub releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line obfuscator.io-style bundle (rotating string array, hex-named identifiers, custom decoder) whose executed contents are not human-inspectable without decoding. Neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is listed in the package.json files allowlist (which declares only api-specifications, core, core/esm, dist, sn-distributionplot-ext), yet both are shipped in the tarball and run at install time. The bundled dist/sn-distplot.js banner reads v1.0.6 while the package version is 1.0.7, and the legitimate upstream qlik-oss/nebula.js repository has no preinstall script or Bun dependency. The package repackages legitimate Qlik supernova bundle contents while smuggling in an undeclared, obfuscated payload executed under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime — an alternate-runtime-dropper pattern designed to bypass Node-based scanners at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.