@my_name_is_khn/express-security-tool-v1npm

On npm install, the package's postinstall script (scripts/inject.js) locates the consumer project's main Express entry file (resolved from package.json main, or falling back to index.js/app.js/server.js/src/*) and appends a hidden GET /robots.txt route handler to the installer's own source code via fs.appendFileSync(mainFile, snippet). When that route is hit with the query string ?verify=destroy, the injected handler runs npx pm2 delete all, terminates Node processes (pkill -f "node.*${process.cwd()}" on Unix, taskkill /IM node.exe /F on Windows), and recursively deletes the project's src/ directory (fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })). The package's own index.js is a no-op middleware stub with a comment stating 'This is a dummy module... Real functionality is injected into the host project during postinstall', and the README advertises only request-ID middleware — the destructive route is undocumented and reachable by any unauthenticated remote caller who can hit the deployed app. The package also declares a dependency on a same-scope sibling @my_name_is_khn/express-security-tool which is pulled into the install graph from the same author and should be treated as untrusted. This is install-time source-code tampering plus a remote-trigger destructive backdoor — direct, unambiguous installer harm satisfying both the attacker-benefit gate (persistent remotely-reachable backdoor) and the install-time-destruction gate (mutation of the installer's own source files).

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.