@modss/baileysnpm
@modss/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15918) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @modss/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
@modss/baileys is a renamed fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library published 2026-09-01 and 2026-09-02 under a scope created the same day. lib/Socket/newsletter.js sets NEWSLETTER_LIST_URL to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dayyy-19/Anu/main/Newsletter.json. On every connection.update with connection === 'open', autoFollowConfiguredNewsletters() fetches that list and issues an executeWMexQuery FOLLOW for each id on the user's own authenticated WhatsApp session, caching followed ids in session/followed-newsletters.json. An Indonesian comment in the file explains that the list lives on GitHub so channels can be added or removed without redeploying the code, i.e. the follow targets are publisher-controlled at runtime. All three published versions carry the identical handler. The package also aliases its libsignal dependency to @modss/libsignal, which pkgwarden read as a plain rename with no malicious content. No credential or session-key theft was observed, and the dead-drop URL was not requested by pkgwarden. All versions were fetched from the npm registry and read by hand on 2026-09-03. Same remote-dead-drop shape as MAL-2026-15819 (@mrlegendbot/baileys) and MAL-2026-13932 (my-auto-follow).
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @modss/baileys (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @modss/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@modss/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @modss/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @modss/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- pkgwarden · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @modss/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.