@mntv-analysis/uinpm

npm user 'conx3993' published this package in a dependency confusion campaign. It squats a name that looks like an internal package and uses version 99.1.1 so misconfigured resolvers pick it over the real one. Version 0.0.0-stage is an empty placeholder. A 'preinstall' hook runs 'index.js', which poses as an IP geolocation helper. On install it sends an HTTPS GET to attacker-controlled host realwbx.com (/ip.php?ip=8.8.8.8) with a hard-coded 'Authorization' value ('2b6e9d1f4a7c0e3b8d5f2a9c6e1b4d7f') unique to this package, then discards the response. The token tells the operator which internal package name the victim installed, and the request reveals the victim's public egress IP.

The package's package.json declares a preinstall script that runs node index.js during npm install. index.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://realwbx.com/ip.php with a hardcoded Authorization header on every install, firing before any user code runs. The destination is unrelated to the declared @mntv-analysis scope and to any publisher-owned infrastructure, and the request's TCP source reveals the installer's public IP to that third-party host along with the hardcoded campaign token. The package otherwise ships a ~1KB index.js, a two-word README, and a vague description about IP/metadata lookup, providing no library surface that a consumer of a UI package would use. The shape is a victim-tagging install beacon inside a scope-styled lure, not a functional UI library.