@marketfront/livestreampreviewpopupnpm
@marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6784) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup (npm)
What this malware does
The @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.
The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.
The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.
The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) whose contents are an obfuscator.io-packed payload (string-array + RC4 decoder, hex identifiers, control-flow flattening) that runs automatically on npm install. On execution it collects installer host and identity data (os.hostname, os.userInfo, os.networkInterfaces, os.platform/release/arch, cwd, npm_config_user_agent, running-process enumeration, and the full process.env) and reads installer-owned secret files under the home directory (SSH keys, cloud credential files, npmrc/pypirc, browser profile data, shell history). The collected data is RC4-encrypted and transmitted to a hardcoded remote endpoint reassembled at runtime via atob() fragments over HTTPS POST, plus a base32-chunked DNS subdomain side-channel (require('dns').Resolver with setServers([hostname]) and resolve4 on <index>.<random>.<chunk>.<random>.<attacker-domain>) to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The advertised library surface is decorative: main points at dist/index.js, which re-exports ../src/index.js, but src/ is not shipped in the tarball, so consumers requiring the package error immediately. The package presents itself as an internal @marketfront Platform-Engineering package with homepage/repo/bugs URLs at nonexistent *.marketfront.io hosts and instructs installers to configure registry=https://npm.marketfront.io, consistent with a dependency-confusion attack against organizations using a private @marketfront scope. Version 7.0.0 with no prior public history reinforces the shadow-a-private-name staging pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.