@marketfront/infopopupnpm
@marketfront/infopopup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6783) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @marketfront/infopopup (npm)
What this malware does
The @marketfront/infopopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.
The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.
The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.
On npm install, the declared postinstall script (scripts/postinstall.js) runs a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style, RC4/XOR string-array decoded) payload that harvests installer-owned secrets and identity: reads ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.gitconfig, and shell history files; bulk-serialises process.env; and collects hostname, user, network interfaces, CPU/OS. The collected data is encrypted and transmitted over two exfiltration channels: an HTTPS POST to a runtime-decoded remote endpoint, and a DNS-tunnel channel built via new dns.Resolver().resolve4(...) that splits the encrypted body into ≤50-character labels queried under an attacker-controlled parent domain to survive HTTPS egress filtering. Package metadata advertises a fabricated corporate identity (*.marketfront.io hosts that do not exist; README references an internal-corp.io auth endpoint) as a dependency-confusion cover story for what is otherwise a credential-stealer. Declared purpose ("internal authentication client") does not require reading AWS/SSH/npm/Docker/Git credential files or DNS-tunnelling encrypted blobs.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/infopopup (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/infopopup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/infopopup is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/infopopup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/infopopup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @marketfront/infopopup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.