@marketfront/gotoauthpopupnpm
@marketfront/gotoauthpopup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6781) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @marketfront/gotoauthpopup (npm)
What this malware does
The @marketfront/gotoauthpopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.
The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.
The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.
@marketfront/[email protected] declares a postinstall hook (scripts.postinstall: 'node scripts/postinstall.js') that automatically runs on npm install. scripts/postinstall.js is a single ~165 KB obfuscator.io-style bundle: an RC4-decoded rotated string array, a self-defending IIFE, and a guard that inspects process.argv and process.env.NODE_OPTIONS for debugger/inspector markers plus a busy-loop timing check and only executes the payload when no debugger is detected. When the guard passes, the script harvests installer host identity (hostname, username, homedir, arch, cpus, platform, release, network interfaces), a bulk dump of process.env, Windows-specific env (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, PROGRAMDATA, TEMP), enumerates the user's home directory via fs.readdirSync, and reads targeted config/credential files via fs.readFileSync. The collected data is RC4-encrypted and POSTed via https.request to a C2 host that is assembled at runtime from atob() fragments so the destination does not appear as a plaintext string in the source. A parallel covert channel base32-encodes the same ciphertext, splits it into ~50-character DNS labels, and issues dns.resolve4() queries against the same host used as the authoritative resolver, providing DNS-tunnel exfiltration to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The package additionally impersonates internal corporate infrastructure — repository github.marketfront.io, bugs jira.marketfront.io, homepage docs.marketfront.io, and README instructing developers to configure registry=https://npm.marketfront.io — a dependency-confusion cover story to induce installation of what appears to be an internal auth SDK. The declared main points at../src/index.js which is not shipped, so the package has no legitimate library functionality; its only on-install effect is the dropper. README framing of the postinstall as 'anonymous telemetry' does not apply — the behavior is bulk credential and configuration harvest with anti-analysis evasion and a covert side channel.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/gotoauthpopup (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/gotoauthpopup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/gotoauthpopup is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/gotoauthpopup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/gotoauthpopup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @marketfront/gotoauthpopup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.