Which versions of @marketfront/errorcounter are malicious?

The following npm versions of @marketfront/errorcounter are flagged malicious: 7.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @marketfront/errorcounter if I installed it?

@marketfront/errorcounter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @marketfront/errorcounter — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @marketfront/errorcounter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @marketfront/errorcounter part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @marketfront/errorcounter is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-008029 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @marketfront/errorcounter across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/errorcounter (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/errorcounter across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@marketfront/errorcounternpm

@marketfront/errorcounter is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6777) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @marketfront/errorcounter (npm)

MAL-2026-6777

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @marketfront/errorcounter

What this malware does

The @marketfront/errorcounter package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

This package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal @marketfront npm scope. The declared library entry point (dist/index.js) re-exports ../src/index.js, which is not shipped — the package is non-functional as advertised. Its only real behavior is the declared postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js), which is a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style string-array RC4 decoder, control-flow dead-code, function/property indirection) payload that runs automatically on npm install. At install time it collects os.hostname, os.type, os.release, os.arch, os.version, os.homedir, os.userInfo().username, os.networkInterfaces, the full process.env, and Windows-specific env vars (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, npm_config_user_agent), packages them with the package name/version and a timestamp into a JSON blob, and ships the blob to a remote endpoint decoded from the obfuscated string array via HTTPS POST with a DNS-tunnel fallback (deliberate evasion of egress filtering). Before exfiltrating, the payload runs anti-analysis checks: it scans process.argv and NODE_OPTIONS against decoded tokens, requires process.mainModule.filename to match a decoded token, and executes a ~1e6-iteration Date.now() timing loop to detect sandboxes/debuggers, gating the exfil behind an internal flag. The combination of an obfuscated payload, anti-sandbox gating, dual exfil channels, a non-functional library shell, and an internal-scope cover story is unambiguous supply-chain malware. Any build system that mis-resolves the @marketfront scope to public npm will auto-run the stealer against its CI secrets, cloud tokens, and environment variables.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

7.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d15a354db253fd90616eb7e33d8c09dd7dd36b691259ec737182a96f9b5d65ab

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/errorcounter (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/errorcounter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/errorcounter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/errorcounter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/errorcounter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @marketfront/errorcounter on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 7.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-008029

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @marketfront/errorcounter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database