Which versions of @marketfront/devtoolsloader are malicious?

The following npm versions of @marketfront/devtoolsloader are flagged malicious: 7.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @marketfront/devtoolsloader if I installed it?

@marketfront/devtoolsloader is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @marketfront/devtoolsloader — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @marketfront/devtoolsloader was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @marketfront/devtoolsloader part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @marketfront/devtoolsloader is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-008025 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @marketfront/devtoolsloader across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/devtoolsloader (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/devtoolsloader across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@marketfront/devtoolsloadernpm

@marketfront/devtoolsloader is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6774) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @marketfront/devtoolsloader (npm)

MAL-2026-6774

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @marketfront/devtoolsloader

What this malware does

The @marketfront/devtoolsloader package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

The package ships a heavily obfuscated postinstall script (scripts/postinstall.js, ~161 KB, obfuscator.io RC4 string-array with control-flow flattening) invoked from package.json ("postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js"). At npm install time the script collects host identifiers (os.userInfo(), os.networkInterfaces(), hostname), enumerates process.env against embedded char-code-encoded arrays of credential-shaped variable names (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, and additional token/secret-shaped keys), and reads installer-side dotfiles (shell history / rc files) via decoded absolute paths. The payload is XOR-encrypted and transmitted via https.request POST and DNS queries to a destination decoded from the obfuscated string array. Execution is gated on sandbox-evasion checks (process.argv[0]/argv[1] inspection, NODE_OPTIONS blocklist tokens, Date.now spin-loop timing) so the payload only fires on real developer machines. The package advertises a fictitious internal corporate infrastructure (@marketfront scope, github.marketfront.io, npm.marketfront.io) and ships no functional library — dist/index.js re-exports../src/index.js which is absent from the tarball — consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting developers expecting an internal @marketfront/* package. Installing this package on a developer or CI machine results in exfiltration of environment variables (including any credentials present in env), host identity, and shell history/config file contents to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

7.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d449d3db7f73a80417996b67687dca9330bf5d0591233c639416a4f2e2b7eb22

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/devtoolsloader (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/devtoolsloader across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/devtoolsloader is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/devtoolsloader was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/devtoolsloader before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @marketfront/devtoolsloader on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 7.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-008025

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @marketfront/devtoolsloader-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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