Which versions of @marketfront/customdealsfeed are malicious?

The following npm versions of @marketfront/customdealsfeed are flagged malicious: 7.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @marketfront/customdealsfeed if I installed it?

@marketfront/customdealsfeed is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @marketfront/customdealsfeed — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @marketfront/customdealsfeed was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @marketfront/customdealsfeed part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @marketfront/customdealsfeed is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-008022 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @marketfront/customdealsfeed across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/customdealsfeed (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/customdealsfeed across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@marketfront/customdealsfeednpm

@marketfront/customdealsfeed is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6772) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @marketfront/customdealsfeed (npm)

MAL-2026-6772

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @marketfront/customdealsfeed

What this malware does

The @marketfront/customdealsfeed package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

The package has no legitimate runtime surface: package.json 'main' re-exports../src/index.js which is not shipped in the tarball, so require() throws. The only executed code is scripts/postinstall.js, a ~165KB obfuscator.io-style payload that runs automatically on npm install. It uses a string-array decoder plus RC4 and XOR routines to hide its behavior, and contains a sandbox-evasion guard that suppresses execution when NODE_OPTIONS or the package name match hardcoded analysis-environment values. At install time the decoded payload collects host and account identity (os.userInfo, hostname, platform, arch, network interfaces), enumerates environment variables (including USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, npm_config_user_agent and a full process.env dump), executes shell commands via child_process, and reads candidate credential/wallet/keystore files under APPDATA/LOCALAPPDATA/TEMP/PROGRAMDATA using a JSON key/value walker. The collected data is bundled into an encrypted JSON blob and transmitted over HTTPS to a hardcoded endpoint, with a DNS side-channel that splits ciphertext into ~50-character chunks encoded as sub.sub.HOST queries to bypass egress filtering. The @marketfront scope and README instruction to add 'registry=https://npm.marketfront.io' to.npmrc — pointing at non-existent infrastructure — is a dependency-confusion lure targeting organizations that have not correctly pinned an internal scope, with a fake 'anonymous telemetry to telemetry.marketfront.io' cover story pre-authorizing the observed network activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

7.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

dcdb247433e08e6bcd6ad2d50beedf663648e089d745d4608959d0e42efac2af

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/customdealsfeed (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/customdealsfeed across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/customdealsfeed is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/customdealsfeed was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/customdealsfeed before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @marketfront/customdealsfeed on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 7.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-008022

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @marketfront/customdealsfeed-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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