Which versions of @marketfront/basemarkettemplate are malicious?

The following npm versions of @marketfront/basemarkettemplate are flagged malicious: 7.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @marketfront/basemarkettemplate if I installed it?

@marketfront/basemarkettemplate is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @marketfront/basemarkettemplate — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @marketfront/basemarkettemplate was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @marketfront/basemarkettemplate part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @marketfront/basemarkettemplate is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-008023 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @marketfront/basemarkettemplate across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/basemarkettemplate (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/basemarkettemplate across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@marketfront/basemarkettemplatenpm

@marketfront/basemarkettemplate is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6767) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 7.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @marketfront/basemarkettemplate (npm)

MAL-2026-6767

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @marketfront/basemarkettemplate

What this malware does

The @marketfront/basemarkettemplate package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

The package ships an obfuscated scripts/postinstall.js (RC4 + shuffled string-array obfuscation, NODE_OPTIONS/argv inspector-flag check, random startup delay) that npm runs automatically on install via package.json's postinstall: node scripts/postinstall.js hook. When executed, the decoded payload collects host identifiers (hostname, username, homedir, platform, npm_config_user_agent), Windows environment variables (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA), and reads installer-owned secret files the package never wrote — shell history (.bash_history,.zsh_history), ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.netrc, and browser profile directories — using readFileSync/readdirSync helpers over byte-array-decoded path strings. The collected data is JSON-serialized, XOR-encrypted, and transmitted over two channels: an HTTPS POST to a runtime-selected hostname, and a DNS-tunnel that base32-encodes the payload into subdomain labels resolved via node's dns module. The package is scoped @marketfront/* and presents itself as an internal HTTP client with fabricated corporate URLs (github.marketfront.io, jira.marketfront.io) and private: false — the classic dependency-confusion shape targeting an organization that uses that scope internally. No real library functionality is shipped; the package is a pure delivery vehicle for the postinstall payload.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

7.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

66d3e4ea5397dbe076b14c24ec39301f31e7c1c3587b3aa98a1cadb9f3e89aa7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @marketfront/basemarkettemplate (version 7.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @marketfront/basemarkettemplate across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@marketfront/basemarkettemplate is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @marketfront/basemarkettemplate was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @marketfront/basemarkettemplate before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @marketfront/basemarkettemplate on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 7.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-008023

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @marketfront/basemarkettemplate-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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