@logdna-web/sharednpm

The @logdna-web/shared package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (the @logdna-web scope (LogDNA/Mezmo-style naming)) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511632708141056.

The package's package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs examples/verify.js. On every npm install, that script initializes Sentry against a hardcoded author-owned DSN at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511632708141056, resolves the installer's public IP via Cloudflare's trace endpoint and attaches it as the Sentry event's user.ip_address, deliberately triggers an exception with sendDefaultPii: true, and flushes the event — uploading installer-side identifiers and host/error context to the author's Sentry project without consent. Independently, src/index.js (the package main) bakes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN, so any library consumer that calls init() without supplying their own DSN silently relays their application's exceptions, IPs, and PII to the author's Sentry account rather than failing. The package is published under the scope @logdna-web, which is brand-adjacent to LogDNA/Mezmo's legitimate @logdna scope, while shipping a Sentry-wrapper of unrelated functionality — consistent with a typosquat lure plus active install-time data collection.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.