@listings/energy-labelsnpm
Malicious code in @listings/energy-labels (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package declares "preinstall": "node index.js || true" in package.json, so on every npm install the script executes automatically and silently swallows errors. index.js collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, process.cwd(), package label), hex-encodes the JSON payload as a DNS subdomain of d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live (an out-of-band interaction service used for exfiltration), and additionally POSTs the same payload over plain HTTP to a hardcoded bare IP http://172.201.213.59:9090/c. There is no TLS, no authentication, no documented purpose, and the bare-IP plus OOB DNS pattern is consistent with dependency-confusion / supply-chain reconnaissance infrastructure. Installer machines are fingerprinted and reported to the attacker on install with no user consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@listings/energy-labels' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @listings/energy-labels (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @listings/energy-labels across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@listings/energy-labels is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @listings/energy-labels was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @listings/energy-labels before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @listings/energy-labels-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.