@limebike/supreme-date-pickersnpm
Malicious code in @limebike/supreme-date-pickers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, both preinstall and postinstall hooks execute index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, all non-internal network interface IP addresses, directory listings of the current working directory, /app, and../../, and the contents of /app/package.json, then POSTs the data as JSON over plain HTTP to http://poc.khz.bar/install. The package is published under the @limebike scope but its README identifies a different target namespace (@doctolib-apps/native-personalized-services) and is annotated 'Claimed by dphoeniixx' — the canonical dependency-confusion shape: register a public package matching a private/internal name, beacon on install to identify which organizations accidentally resolve to the public registry. Author and description metadata are empty placeholders.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @limebike/supreme-date-pickers (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @limebike/supreme-date-pickers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@limebike/supreme-date-pickers establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @limebike/supreme-date-pickers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @limebike/supreme-date-pickers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @limebike/supreme-date-pickers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.