@library-wide/library-shellnpm
Advisory published Updated
@library-wide/library-shell is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17754) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 99.9.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @library-wide/library-shell (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares the sole dependency 'ltidisafe' as a direct HTTPS tarball URL (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.8.4.tgz) rather than a registry version range, with no integrity hash and no version pin. The shipped index.js is an empty stub, so the manifest is the entire published surface: on npm install, the tarball at that URL is fetched and installed, and any lifecycle scripts inside it execute on the installer's machine. Whoever controls that bucket path controls the code that runs. The package name 'library-shell' and scope '@library-wide' do not correspond to any functional code in the tarball, consistent with a lure whose only purpose is to pull in the off-registry dependency.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@library-wide/library-shell' @ 99.9.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @library-wide/library-shell (version 99.9.1).
If you installed it — respond
Remove @library-wide/library-shell from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @library-wide/library-shell was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @library-wide/library-shell-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.