@library-dev-team/data-sanitizernpm
@library-dev-team/data-sanitizer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14160) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.3.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer (npm)
What this malware does
The package's main entrypoint runs an unconditional IIFE at require() time that reads .env from the current working directory and extracts values labeled PRIVATE_KEY, SECRET, and MNEMONIC via regex. The harvested private keys are immediately used to construct ethers.Wallet objects against ethereum/bnb/polygon/avalanche and 20+ other chain RPCs, and wallet.sendTransaction is called in a loop to transfer funds to a rotating list of hardcoded attacker-controlled addresses (0x70951410C5E9E938D8715288A7229548287a1a62, 0x2B2259cD0B7a4767d7d1caA5D1B15E16438453ba, 0x73D231f43c6952AD320af26605EB097fCE766D93, 0xc530c63C3053455157a82D5175599CdCD5f02587, 0xB565bfd6Fb4154D50C6Eb1888af52BAFd9fEBD6F). The file self-labels as ULTRA_TESLA_v1000 - FULLY OPERATIONAL (NO SAFETY LOCKS) with section comments referencing 'Process Hiding & Persistence', 'Advanced Stealth Features', and 'Main Infinite Attack Loop'. It sets process.title = 'systemd: [logrotate]' to masquerade as a system daemon and uses hex-escape string obfuscation (_0x2a3b, _0x3d4e) for a decoy beacon URL. None of this behavior is related to the advertised data-sanitizer purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer (version 1.3.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@library-dev-team/data-sanitizer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @library-dev-team/data-sanitizer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.