@langgraphjs/toolkitnpm
Malicious code in @langgraphjs/toolkit (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package collects and sends sensitive system info to a hardcoded server. The package masquerades as a LangGraph JS utility but contains a malicious postinstall script.
The package's scripts/postinstall.js executes on npm install and collects installer-side identity and cloud/git metadata, then POSTs it as JSON to a hardcoded Google Cloud Run endpoint at npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app. Collected data includes: git-configured emails from ~/.gitconfig,.git/config, and up to 15 reflog HEAD author emails; GitHub CLI login and email from hosts.yml; SSH public key comments from ~/.ssh/*.pub; GCP project and account identifiers from ~/.config/gcloud/properties; AWS profile names from ~/.aws/config; /etc/resolv.conf search domain; os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, os.platform(), and cwd; plus parent project package.json details. The package name @langgraphjs/toolkit impersonates the legitimate @langchain/langgraph ecosystem (and the langgraphjs.guide domain referenced in the script), and declares @langchain/langgraph and @langchain/core as dependencies to appear legitimate. Its advertised main entry dist/index.js is not shipped in the tarball — only src/ and scripts/ — so the only code that actually runs on install is the harvester. Behavior is framed as anonymous telemetry/compatibility diagnostics, but the systematic enumeration of ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.gitconfig, and git reflog is credential-adjacent identity theft, not telemetry.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @langgraphjs/toolkit (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @langgraphjs/toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@langgraphjs/toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @langgraphjs/toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @langgraphjs/toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @langgraphjs/toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.