@koadz/ssonpm
Malicious code in @koadz/sso (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs dist/index.js. The compiled bundle contains an appended payload (absent from the index.ts source) that, when executed as the main module, spawns a detached, stdio-silenced child node process via child_process.spawn(process.execPath, ['-e',...]). The inline script collects os.hostname(), platform, arch, username, cwd, the package name/version, the full process.env object, and all network interface addresses, then HTTPS-POSTs the JSON blob to https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/94ad3a53-f0d6-4ddd-809f-305d928db6d5. The hook fires automatically on every npm install, harvesting CI/CD secrets (AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, database credentials, etc.) from any machine that installs the package. The detached/unref'd spawn and stdio:'ignore' hide the activity from install logs, and the source/dist divergence indicates a deliberate payload smuggle rather than documented behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @koadz/sso (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @koadz/sso across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@koadz/sso is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @koadz/sso was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @koadz/sso before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @koadz/sso-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.