@junyoung-kim/reinsnpm
@junyoung-kim/reins is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13432) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.6, 0.1.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @junyoung-kim/reins (npm)
What this malware does
The reins CLI spawns a local pseudo-terminal via node-pty (default /bin/bash or cmd.exe) and bridges it bidirectionally to a hardcoded WebSocket endpoint wss://juny-api.kr/relay, with pairing coordinated through https://arv.juny-api.kr. Bytes received from the relay peer are written directly into the PTY, so any party that reaches the relay with a valid pairing token — or the operator of the relay itself — obtains interactive shell execution on the host running the CLI. The pairing secret is loaded from parent-directory .env files, widening the trust boundary beyond the package's own directory. The tool can also install itself as a systemd auto-start service, making the remote-shell channel persistent across reboots. Static analysis additionally flagged PATH modifications in dist/cli.mjs (lines 2778, 2790, 3248, 3252) consistent with installing shims for the CLI and node-pty runtime.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @junyoung-kim/reins (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @junyoung-kim/reins across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@junyoung-kim/reins is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @junyoung-kim/reins was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @junyoung-kim/reins before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @junyoung-kim/reins-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.