@iobandamwer/native-helpernpm

The package self-labels as a 'temporary placeholder stub' in package.json and README but ships active install-time dropper artifacts: a 93-byte index.js that loads a native addon (addon.node ELF for Linux, addon_win.node PE for Windows), an 8 MB opaque.napi_cache blob, and a postinstall script that calls addon.init() during npm install. The native addon decodes the shipped.napi_cache blob, writes it to a hidden temp path (/tmp/.<pid> on Linux,.nc<n>.js on Windows), chmods it executable, and detaches it via fork + setsid + execlp so it continues to run after npm install completes. Before executing the dropped payload, the addon checks for CI environment variables (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NOW_GITHUB_DEPLOYMENT, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER), inspects /proc/1/cgroup and /proc/1/cmdline for containerd/dockerinit markers, reads /proc/self/status for TracerPid, and probes /proc/self/maps and /proc/meminfo to detect analysis sandboxes and debuggers, gating execution on a non-CI, non-container, non-instrumented host. The payload bytes are opaque and attacker-controlled, delivered through the native addon rather than inspectable JavaScript. Installing this package on a developer workstation causes attacker-controlled code to execute detached from the install process.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.