@iobandamwer/cache-helpernpm
Advisory published Updated
@iobandamwer/cache-helper is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18329) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.0.0-stage, 1.0.2, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @iobandamwer/cache-helper (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as 'Cache utilities' but ships no source, no binding.gyp, and no build configuration — only two prebuilt native addons (addon.node ELF for Linux, addon_win.node PE for Windows) and a 4,164,844-byte opaque, high-entropy file named.napi_cache with no readable strings and no magic header. The package.json postinstall hook runs node -e "try{require(process.platform==='win32'?'./addon_win.node':'./addon.node').init()}catch(e){}", loading the platform-specific native binary and invoking init() on every install, with the error swallowed to suppress install-time noise. The Linux addon contains the format string '%s/.napi_cache' alongside fopen64/fread, references a '/tmp/.%u' staging path, and uses fork, setsid, execlp, chmod and _exit primitives — the shape of a drop-and-detach loader that reads the bundled.napi_cache blob, writes it to a hidden /tmp path, chmods it executable and runs it as a detached process. The addon also encodes an extensive evasion suite: environment checks for GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NETLIFY, VERCEL, CF_BUILD_ID and SANDBOX; container probes against /proc/1/cgroup, docker, containerd, kubepod and podman; a TracerPid: debugger check via /proc/self/status; and host fingerprinting through /proc/meminfo, /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/self/maps. The combination — hollow self-description, source-less native binaries, lifecycle-hook execution of a staged opaque payload, and CI/sandbox/debugger gating — has no overlap with any legitimate cache library and is the fingerprint of an install-time dropper for attacker-controlled code.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @iobandamwer/cache-helper (13 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
Remove @iobandamwer/cache-helper from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @iobandamwer/cache-helper was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @iobandamwer/cache-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.