@intentsolution/database-security-scannernpm
Malicious code in @intentsolution/database-security-scanner (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's main file (index.js) is heavily obfuscated using obfuscator.io-style string-array rotation, base64 fragments, and per-byte XOR decoders (e.g. H(a0) with key k=[0x70,0xa0,0x89,0x48]) that hide strings such as 'package.json', 'node_modules', '.vscode', 'npm i --silent', 'nohup', 'cd', and 'f.js'. On require(), it collects host identifiers — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, os.platform(), Date.now(), process.argv[1] — and beacons them as {ts,type,hid,ss,cc} to a hardcoded C2 endpoint whose host is reassembled at runtime from obfuscated constant arrays (X/z) to evade static detection. The C2 response is used to fetch a second-stage JavaScript payload via GET '<host>/f/<R>', which is written to ~/.vscode/f.js along with a fake package.json; the package then runs cd "<dir>" && npm i --silent and spawns node f.js detached (with nohup on Linux) to persist execution. A setInterval retries the beacon on failure. The package's advertised purpose ("database-security-scanner") is a cover story — package.json has empty author/description/license and no database-scanning code exists; the entire module is the dropper. Any installer that requires this package executes attacker-supplied code fetched at runtime with no hash verification, hidden staging in ~/.vscode, and detached persistence.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @intentsolution/database-security-scanner (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @intentsolution/database-security-scanner across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@intentsolution/database-security-scanner establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @intentsolution/database-security-scanner was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @intentsolution/database-security-scanner before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @intentsolution/database-security-scanner-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.