@insiderintelligence/componentlibrarynpm
@insiderintelligence/componentlibrary is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16353) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 9.9.10). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary (npm)
What this malware does
The package declares scripts.install: node index.js, so npm install auto-executes index.js which loads runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js. That module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory's leaf name, joins them with a fixed prefix (iiclib) and a timestamp into a subdomain label, and issues a dns.resolve4() query against oob.algamil7x.xyz — exfiltrating installer identity via a DNS side-channel that bypasses HTTP egress controls. The destination host, the module names ('os','dns','process'), and the resolved API names ('userInfo','hostname','cwd','resolve4','_load') are hidden behind String.fromCharCode arrays in sibling helpers a8e4c9.js and f7d3b8.js, and the module is loaded via module.constructor._load through encoded literals to disguise the primitive as a 'connectivity probe'. The same path also runs on require() because index.js is the package main. The behavior has no connection to the package's stated component-library purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary (version 9.9.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@insiderintelligence/componentlibrary is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.