@immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlabnpm

The package ships a binding.gyp at the package root whose targets/sources fields contain GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) at line 6. npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present, even without any declared install/postinstall script, and node-gyp/GYP evaluates <!(...) as a shell command during the configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute on every npm install of this package as a transitive or direct dependency. The package presents itself as a Backstage GitLab plugin (a pure TypeScript/React frontend plugin), a category that has no legitimate need to build a native addon — and consistent with that, no C/C++ source files are shipped alongside binding.gyp, so the file's only effect is to run the embedded shell command at install time. The traced content of this install-time code path was withheld by the upstream model's malware-output safety filter, which is itself a corroborating signal that the executed content reads as operational malware rather than benign build logic.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.