@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agentnpm
@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13364) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.1.51, 1.1.52, 1.1.53…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent (npm)
What this malware does
Package ships an agent daemon (vanexa-agent start, entry bin/vanexa-agent.js) that receives commands from a remote phone app and executes them on the installer's host via child_process/spawn, including powershell.exe and inline JS/Python evaluation. Rather than the LAN-only WebSocket architecture described in the README (which claims BYOK with no middleman), the compiled bundle hardcodes two Cloudflare Workers endpoints — vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev and vanexa-ai-proxy.hanazaki542.workers.dev — hosted on a personal Cloudflare account (hanazaki542) that does not match the npm publisher (ikbalsakata500445jensen). Commands from the phone client and, via the AI proxy path, user-supplied prompt content and API tokens transit this third-party intermediary before reaching the local execution sinks on the installer's machine. The primary runtime is shipped as V8 bytecode (dist/bundle.jsc) produced from dist/bundle.cjs at postinstall via bytenode.compileFile, and the bin entry loads that bytecode with require(bytecodePath), reducing auditability of the network-driven exec path. The combination — network-sourced commands flowing into local shell/child_process, a hardcoded author-controlled relay whose ownership does not match the publisher, and a bytecode-compiled payload — makes normal operator use of this agent equivalent to granting the relay operator remote command execution on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent (35 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.