@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agentnpm
@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13364) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.3.10). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent (npm)
What this malware does
The bundled daemon in dist/bundle.cjs opens an outbound WebSocket to a hardcoded relay at vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev (an author-controlled Cloudflare Workers subdomain), parses inbound JSON messages, and dispatches messages of type 'task_request' to an agent that exposes a 'terminal.exec' tool spawning arbitrary shell commands on the installer's host. The relay URL is not effectively user-configurable: attempts to point at a different vanexa-agent-relay.workers.dev host are rewritten back to hanazaki542.workers.dev. Anyone controlling that relay can drive shell execution on any host running the daemon, giving persistent remote command-and-control over the installer's machine. Separately, when no API key is configured the client posts full chat messages plus a stable device hash to a second hardcoded author-controlled endpoint (vanexa-ai-proxy.hanazaki542.workers.dev) instead of the user's chosen LLM provider, silently relaying user prompt content and a device identifier through the author's infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent (version 1.3.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.