@ibrahim1337/baksennpm
Malicious code in @ibrahim1337/baksen (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package @ibrahim1337/baksen ships a Windows x64 infostealer toolkit that targets Chromium-family browsers (Chrome, Brave, Edge, Opera, Opera GX) on the machine running the CLI. The JS layer enumerates browser profile directories and reads the 'Local State', 'Cookies', and 'Login Data' SQLite databases, executing queries such as SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins and SELECT host_key, name, encrypted_value,... FROM cookies. It extracts the AES master key and the Chrome v20 os_crypt.app_bound_encrypted_key from Local State, then decrypts cookies and saved passwords with AES-256-GCM and writes the plaintext credentials to local _cookies/ and _passwords/ directories. A bundled opaque Windows native addon build/Release/debugelevator.node (declared in package.json files, os: win32, cpu: x64) performs the App-Bound key elevation — the documented technique used by recent Chromium infostealers to bypass Chrome v20 encryption. Strings inside the bundle include 'DebugElevator - scanning all detected browsers', 'Launching... browser(s) in parallel for App-Bound key', and 'APP-KEY'. A license module fetches an allowlist of valid keys from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tabo1337/SaatPCBKod/refs/heads/main/key.txt (an account unrelated to the publisher) and caches the result at ~/.baksen_cache, indicating a sold/distributed hacktool model. Package metadata is placeholder ('hadiyapic' description, github.com/yourusername/baksen repository URL) with no legitimate provenance. Installing and running this package on a Windows host with any of the listed browsers results in extraction of saved passwords and session cookies — credential theft against the machine running it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ibrahim1337/baksen (19 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ibrahim1337/baksen across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ibrahim1337/baksen is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @ibrahim1337/baksen was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ibrahim1337/baksen before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ibrahim1337/baksen-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.