@hrmony/pladddform-shared-infrastructurenpm

On module import, index.js executes three exfiltration routines that POST harvested secrets to the hardcoded endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-shared-infrastructure. (1) A beacon POST with body {"c53":"hello"} fires first to confirm the victim. (2) aws_get() queries the AWS Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv2) for instance identity, EC2 security credentials, and iterates /iam/security-credentials/ to retrieve every attached IAM role's temporary credentials, then ships the aggregated JSON to the attacker host. (3) local_get() enumerates all process.env variables and recursively reads /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service-account tokens and mounted secret volumes), POSTing both to the same host. The package name resembles an internal-looking scope (@hrmony/pladddform-shared-infrastructure with a typo in 'pladddform') consistent with a dependency-confusion lure, and declares a dependency on @hrmony/kit-5 in the same author-controlled scope that would be pulled in on install. Any host importing this package on EC2 or in Kubernetes loses its cloud IAM credentials, workload identity, and full process environment to the attacker.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.