@hrmony/pladddform-partner-registrynpm

On import, index.js executes a top-level fetch that harvests cloud and container secrets from the installer host and POSTs them to the hardcoded attacker endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-partner-registry. The collection code queries the AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254 using IMDSv2, enumerates IAM role names under /iam/security-credentials/, fetches the temporary IAM security credentials, the instance identity document, and EC2 user-data, enumerates every entry of process.env, and recursively reads all files under /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service-account tokens and mounted secrets). The collected payload is serialized as JSON and sent to the attacker-controlled host. The package name uses a typo-shape ('pladddform') under the @hrmony scope and declares a dependency on a sibling '@hrmony/kit-5', consistent with a coordinated typosquat/dependency-confusion campaign. The package provides no legitimate functionality; its sole on-import effect is credential and secret exfiltration.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.