@hrmony/pladddform-corenpm

On top-level module load, index.js queries the AWS instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv2), retrieves the instance identity document, network interface information, and IAM security-credentials for every attached role (including temporary access key IDs, secret access keys, and session tokens), then POSTs the aggregated data to the hardcoded attacker endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-core. In the same import-time code path, it enumerates every entry in process.env and recursively reads all files under /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service account tokens and mounted secrets) and POSTs those to the same host. The package exposes no functional API; its only behavior on require/import is credential and secret harvesting. package.json also declares a runtime dependency on the sibling scoped package @hrmony/kit-5 at ^1.0.0, which is fetched from the same author scope during install. The scoped name @hrmony/pladddform-core resembles a legitimate 'platform-core' package name, and the exfil host uses an attacker-controlled domain (h4x.tv) with a self-descriptive path.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.