@hrmony/pladddform-codegennpm

On module load, index.js unconditionally beacons to the hardcoded non-first-party endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-codegen and then performs three credential-harvest flows against the installer: (1) queries the AWS instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv2), enumerates IAM role names, retrieves each role's security credentials, and collects the EC2 identity document, user-data, and network-interface metadata; (2) enumerates all process.env entries; (3) recursively reads /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes projected service-account tokens and mounted secrets). The collected data is POSTed to the same hardcoded attacker host. The package name is a typosquat of an @hrmony scoped package with an inflated version (49.99.0) consistent with a dependency-confusion attempt, and it declares an internal-looking sibling dependency @hrmony/kit-5. The exfiltration URL path embeds the package name, indicating a campaign-style beacon per lure.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.