@hrmony/pladddform-applicationnpm

On module load, the package's main entry point executes three exfiltration routines that POST installer-side secrets to the hardcoded endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-application. (1) An install beacon sends a small JSON confirmation to that URL via top-level await. (2) aws_get() contacts AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254, obtains an IMDSv2 token, and reads iam/security-credentials/, identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance, the instance identity document, user-data, and network/interfaces/, then POSTs the collected object to the attacker host. (3) local_get() enumerates all process.env entries and recursively reads every file under /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service-account tokens and mounted secrets) and POSTs the combined payload to the same host. Package metadata (misspelled scoped name @hrmony/pladddform-application, empty description, generic author, self-referential @hrmony/kit-5 dependency) is consistent with a dependency-confusion payload targeting an internal package name. Any require or import of the package on a host with an AWS IMDS endpoint or Kubernetes secret mounts exfiltrates IAM role temporary credentials, environment variables, and mounted secrets to the attacker's h4x.tv domain.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.