@hrmony/interfacesnpm

index.js executes top-level async code on any require/import of the package. The code (1) obtains an AWS IMDSv2 token and fetches EC2 instance identity, IAM role temporary security credentials from /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> and identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance, plus user-data and network metadata; (2) serializes the full process.env; (3) recursively reads /var/run/secrets/, which on Kubernetes contains service-account tokens and mounted secrets; and (4) POSTs the aggregated JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_interfaces. The package ships a single ~5KB file with an empty description under the name @hrmony/interfaces (resembling a private/internal scope), and the exfiltration URL path is tagged per-package, consistent with a dependency-confusion campaign. The exfiltrated IAM role credentials grant AWS API access under the installing host's role; captured environment variables and Kubernetes service-account tokens grant further access to CI, build, and cluster resources.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.