@help-forms/application-affnpm
Malicious code in @help-forms/application-aff (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@help-forms/[email protected] ships a heavily obfuscated postinstall script (scripts/postinstall.js, obfuscator.io fingerprints: rotated string array, base64+decodeURIComponent decoder, hex-named identifiers, self-defending wrapper) that runs automatically on npm install. The script ascends from process.cwd() to locate a project root (package.json/.git/node_modules markers), DJB-hashes that path as a per-project cache key under os.tmpdir(), supports a RECON_ONLY env-var mode, and uses a 7-day cache marker so the dropper only fires once per project. It then detects os.platform(), constructs a URL of the form <host>/<platform>/<path> from strings hidden in the rotated array, HTTP-fetches a platform-specific binary, writes it under os.tmpdir(), and spawns it with {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'} followed by .unref(). There is no hash or signature verification, no pinned URL, and no documentation of the fetched binary's purpose. The package itself is a decoy: package.json advertises an Internal HTTP client for the Help-Forms Platform Engineering team and points at non-resolving *.help-forms.io domains, but the tarball only contains README.md, package.json, scripts/, and dist/. dist/index.js does require('../src/index.js') while no src/ directory ships, so any consumer of the advertised createClient/get/post API will hit a require error — but only after the postinstall dropper has already executed. The combination of obfuscation, install-time outbound fetch from a hidden URL, opaque platform-specific binary execution as a detached background process, project-fingerprinting recon, and decoy library shape is the canonical supply-chain dropper pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @help-forms/application-aff (version 3.4.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @help-forms/application-aff across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @help-forms/application-aff from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @help-forms/application-aff was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @help-forms/application-aff before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @help-forms/application-aff-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.