Which versions of @hanzofc/baileys are malicious?

The following npm versions of @hanzofc/baileys are flagged malicious: 7.0.0, 7.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @hanzofc/baileys if I installed it?

@hanzofc/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @hanzofc/baileys — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @hanzofc/baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

How do I find @hanzofc/baileys across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @hanzofc/baileys (2 malicious versions).

Malicious package

@hanzofc/baileysnpm

Advisory published Sep 30, 2026Updated Sep 30, 2026

@hanzofc/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17354) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 7.0.0, 7.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @hanzofc/baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-17354

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @hanzofc/baileys

What this malware does

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join.

The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.

The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.

Affected package: @hanzofc/baileys (npm), version(s): 7.0.1, 7.0.0.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

7.0.07.0.1

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @hanzofc/baileys (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@hanzofc/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @hanzofc/baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @hanzofc/baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 7.0.0, 7.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

References

ox.security

Credits

OX Security · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @hanzofc/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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