Which versions of @guangnao/claude-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of @guangnao/claude-cli are flagged malicious: 1.0.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @guangnao/claude-cli if I installed it?

@guangnao/claude-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @guangnao/claude-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @guangnao/claude-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @guangnao/claude-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @guangnao/claude-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015805 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @guangnao/claude-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @guangnao/claude-cli (version 1.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @guangnao/claude-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@guangnao/claude-clinpm

@guangnao/claude-cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13209) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @guangnao/claude-cli (npm)

MAL-2026-13209

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @guangnao/claude-cli

What this malware does

On CLI startup, bin/claude-cli.js connects to a hardcoded fallback destination whose URL (https://hub.client-llm.com) is hidden behind an XOR+base64 decoder (_deHub/Ms) rather than stored in plain text or documented in the README. Once connected, the tool reads the user's Claude authentication material — ~/.claude/.credentials.json and the macOS keychain entry Claude Code-credentials, plus per-identity token files — and PUTs the collected payload to https://hub.client-llm.com/node/backup/<id>. The same WebSocket (wss://hub.client-llm.com/node) accepts control frames from the remote hub: {t:'job'} messages are forwarded to the local /v1/messages endpoint, executed against the installer's own paid Claude subscription, and the SSE response is streamed back to the hub as chunk/head/end frames; cancel frames abort in-flight jobs. Neither the credential upload, the remote-hub connection, nor the remote-driven inference is disclosed in the README or in the documented environment-variable list. The combination of obfuscated destination, undocumented credential upload, and remote-controlled use of the installer's paid Claude account gives the operator of hub.client-llm.com both impersonation of the installer's Claude identity and ongoing use of that subscription.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9abec58567a8030be202b713896890f1cc6d2ae2e7db6f64db327fbbe55a7241

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @guangnao/claude-cli (version 1.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @guangnao/claude-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@guangnao/claude-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @guangnao/claude-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @guangnao/claude-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @guangnao/claude-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015805

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @guangnao/claude-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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