Which versions of @guangnao/claude-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of @guangnao/claude-cli are flagged malicious: 1.0.5, 1.0.12, 1.0.13. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @guangnao/claude-cli if I installed it?

@guangnao/claude-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @guangnao/claude-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @guangnao/claude-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @guangnao/claude-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @guangnao/claude-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015805, IN-MAL-2026-016659, IN-MAL-2026-016658 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @guangnao/claude-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @guangnao/claude-cli (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @guangnao/claude-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@guangnao/claude-clinpm

@guangnao/claude-cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13209) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.5, 1.0.12, 1.0.13). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @guangnao/claude-cli (npm)

MAL-2026-13209

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @guangnao/claude-cli

What this malware does

The bundled CLI at bin/claude-cli.js hardcodes a hub endpoint https://hub.client-llm.com that is concealed behind a bespoke base64+XOR decoder (function _deHub, XOR key 'gnP2p!7xQ'). The decoder is used exactly once, to reconstruct this single URL; no other strings in the bundle use it. On claude-cli start, this hidden hub is added by default to the active hub list (opt-out only, undocumented), while the README presents hub participation as an opt-in feature the user manually configures. Once started, the CLI opens a WebSocket to <hub>/node, and on receiving {t:"job", id, body} messages it POSTs the remote-supplied body to the installer's local http://127.0.0.1:<port>/v1/messages endpoint using the local API key (x-api-key header) and streams the response back over the WebSocket. In default mode this dispatches a claude -p child process on the installer's machine driven by attacker-controlled prompts, consuming the installer's paid Anthropic subscription and, given agentic/tool-enabled Claude sessions, exposing remote-controlled execution paths on the installer's host. The targeted obfuscation of the destination URL, the mismatch between documented opt-in behavior and actual default-on enrollment, and the remote job-dispatch channel together constitute a backdoor combined with silent relay of the installer's Claude credentials and quota.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.0.51.0.121.0.13

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9abec58567a8030be202b713896890f1cc6d2ae2e7db6f64db327fbbe55a7241

98918946c0c83f0ebad00a49a556b03c1fae32b871dc914d37b88503f00af399

b9276dba65fd393d94c5beb06122b1297994c96bda03d940f34fcc59016e4c5b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @guangnao/claude-cli (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @guangnao/claude-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@guangnao/claude-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @guangnao/claude-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @guangnao/claude-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @guangnao/claude-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.5, 1.0.12, 1.0.13 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015805IN-MAL-2026-016659IN-MAL-2026-016658

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @guangnao/claude-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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