@galicia-toolkit/tag-managernpm
Advisory published Updated
@galicia-toolkit/tag-manager is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17691) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 999.0.3, 999.0.5, 999.0.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @galicia-toolkit/tag-manager (npm)
What this malware does
@galicia-toolkit/tag-manager claims the @galicia-toolkit scope and describes itself as a dependency-confusion PoC. Its postinstall hook runs node postinstall.js || true on npm install; the script collects host, platform, runtime, network, and environment data, then sends it over HTTP to oob.s4yhii.com:9999 and encodes hostname, username, platform, and architecture in DNS queries to subdomains of oob.s4yhii.com. The npm account s4yhii_ published versions 999.0.3 and 999.0.5 on 2026-10-08; 999.0.6 runs the same node postinstall.js || true command on install, sends the same DNS queries, and connects to 66.94.100.203:9999.
@galicia-toolkit/[email protected] is a scoped dependency-confusion squat whose entire payload runs from a postinstall hook. On npm install, postinstall.js reads a curated list of credential-grade environment variables (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN), enumerates the full process.env key list, and collects host reconnaissance (hostname, username, platform, arch, kernel, cwd, uid, external IPs, CPU/memory). The collected data is exfiltrated over two channels to a hardcoded external host: an HTTP POST to oob.s4yhii.com:9999/dep-confusion, and DNS beacons encoding hostname/username under *.dc.oob.s4yhii.com. index.js is empty — the package has no library functionality; its only effect is the install-time exfiltration. The package.json uses an inflated 999.0.6 version consistent with winning resolution against an internal @galicia-toolkit scope. A self-label as a bug-bounty PoC in the description does not change the behavior: any installer that resolves this scoped name has its cloud and CI credentials sent to a non-first-party host.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @galicia-toolkit/tag-manager (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@galicia-toolkit/tag-manager is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @galicia-toolkit/tag-manager was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- InvisiRisk, Inc. · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @galicia-toolkit/tag-manager-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.