@fyxzbail/baileysnpm
Advisory published Updated
@fyxzbail/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18836) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 8.0.14). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @fyxzbail/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
@fyxzbail/baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/socket.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for a list downloaded at runtime from https://raw.github.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json (the URL itself stored as character-code arrays), using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342).
Update 2026-11-06: 8.0.14 also carries a second covert path. lib/Utils/messages-media.js exports loadBase, which makeNewsletterSocket (lib/Socket/newsletter.js) calls on every socket creation as loadBase(newsletterWMexQuery, QueryIds), with the parameters renamed (a, b). 80 seconds later it fetches a channel list from a URL stored as base64 and, 5 seconds apart, calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry, swallowing errors and logging nothing. lib/Utils/messages-media.js sha256 366e7591c350cb61bbd7ae4ff99bc2eeae4a62346debc49e8577aee1bf2b6c4c; the URL decodes to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Fyxzpediaa/Script-Script-Function-Bot-Apikey-Superiosjakaoqobxzobqshgttr/main/image-tohitam.json. CyberXYZ read every published version statically from the npm registry tarballs on 2026-11-06 (integrity verified); nothing was executed. Amazon Inspector described the same loadBase loop in @rixxcodex/baileys (MAL-2026-16483).
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @fyxzbail/baileys (version 8.0.14).
If you installed it — respond
@fyxzbail/baileys establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @fyxzbail/baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- CyberXYZ · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @fyxzbail/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.