@frostnode/waitfornpm
@frostnode/waitfor is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6305) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.9.0, 0.10.3, 0.10.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @frostnode/waitfor (npm)
What this malware does
@frostnode/waitfor (malicious versions 0.9.0, 0.10.3, 0.10.4, and 0.10.5, published by [email protected]) is a trojanized npm package belonging to the wshu.net credential-stealer campaign. The campaign published trojanized look-alike utility packages across 12+ scopes whose publisher accounts all follow the pattern <scope>-<6 random chars>@wshu.net, with every scope created on June 4, 2026 in a ~40-minute burst. This package masquerades as a wait/delay utility and ships real, working utility code so it passes a glance, while bundling a much larger malicious payload (lib/tickinit.js in the earliest variant, dist/cjs/tickinit.cjs thereafter). package.json declares a postinstall hook (e.g. "node ./dist/cjs/tickinit.cjs") that runs the payload automatically on npm install. The payload is heavily obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator (hex-named identifiers, a while (!![]) array-rotation IIFE, base64+RC4 string decoding, control-flow flattening, and runtime-decrypted module resolution to stay out of the static module graph). At runtime it is a Chromium browser credential stealer: it reads Chromium Cookies and Login Data and decrypts saved passwords protected by AES-256-GCM (the v10/v11 app-bound key schemes), then exfiltrates them over HTTPS using a spoofed Mozilla/5.0 user agent. Consistent with the campaign, the dangerous versions sit in mid-ranges while the latest tag (0.10.6) points to a scrubbed release with an empty scripts block. Malicious payload dist/cjs/tickinit.cjs (0.10.5) SHA-256: 2de602e6422a991346aaf0b74ed6bd525215f5177b9f7f267ccb4d82e919273d.
Package is published under scope @frostnode but its package.json homepage and repository point at https://github.com/mmustra/rxjs-poll — the legitimate rxjs-poll library by a different maintainer. The library source in dist/cjs/index.js is a near-verbatim copy of mmustra/rxjs-poll with one injected line: var _trapHook = require('./tickinit.cjs') at the top, and _trapHook.runPrepare() invoked from inside the package's only documented export, poll(config) (dist/cjs/index.js:204). dist/cjs/tickinit.cjs is a ~259KB obfuscator.io-protected blob (string-array shuffling, RC4-decoded property names, control-flow flattening, runtime Function(...) construction). It carries hardcoded base64 ciphertext that is decrypted at runtime via crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', …) to recover a C2 URL, then re-launches the user's node binary under an env-var sentinel, dynamically requires child_process/fs/os/https/crypto, downloads attacker-controlled bytes to os.tmpdir(), writes a .lock JSON with sha256, and spawns the downloaded file via child_process.spawn(process.execPath, [tmpfile], {detached:true}).unref(). tickinit.cjs additionally exports onInstall = () => runPrepare() and ends with if (require.main === module) onInstall();, providing extra trigger surfaces (direct node tickinit.cjs invocation, or a future postinstall hook) for the same dropper. Any consumer who imports @frostnode/waitfor and calls poll() — the documented and sole API — gets remote-code execution on their machine with no consent, no version pinning, and no signature verification of the downloaded payload. The AES-GCM-wrapped destination, repackaging of an unrelated maintainer's library under a new scope, and multiple redundant trigger paths are the canonical malicious-dropper fingerprint.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @frostnode/waitfor (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @frostnode/waitfor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@frostnode/waitfor is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @frostnode/waitfor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @frostnode/waitfor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @frostnode/waitfor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.